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Water quality trading is being promoted by the U.S. EPA and explored by several states 
as a means for achieving water quality goals, especially within the context of EPA’s 
Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) program. Water quality trading is fundamentally a 
decentralized mechanism for allocating, as required by the TMDL program, pollution 
loads among alternative sources consistent with an overall pollution load target.  The 
primary objective of trading is to achieve water quality goals cost-effectively by allowing 
pollution sources with high control costs to meet their regulatory obligations by 
purchasing environmentally equivalent pollution reductions from pollution sources with 
lower costs. 
A major challenge to the success of water quality trading is to control agricultural 
nonpoint sources.  Agricultural nonpoint sources are the leading cause of remaining water 
quality problems and must be controlled if water quality objectives are to be achieved in 
many watersheds.  Yet, the very character of nonpoint pollution, unobservable and 
stochastic discharges, greatly complicates the design of markets.  Economic research on 
the design of markets with nonpoint sources has focused largely on two questions.  One is 
the appropriate choice of the “commodity” for nonpoint trades.  Major options considered 
have been modeled emissions and inputs that determine nonpoint loads.  A second 
question is the appropriate design of trading ratios for trades between point and nonpoint 
sources to account for their being, due primarily to the relative uncertainty about 
nonpoint loads, imperfect substitutes.
This research explores the implications of transactions costs for the design and 3
performance of water quality trading systems including point and agricultural nonpoint 
sources.  Although the impacts of transactions costs on tradable permit markets with 
point sources have received significant attention, there is little research on transactions 
costs in point-nonpoint source (PS/NPS) pollution trading.  Like other trading systems, 
transactions costs in PS/NPS pollution trading can act as barriers to trade, suppressing the 
number of trades to a level below that could have been obtained in the costless trade case.  
This is because transactions costs would expect to increase the permit prices for point and 
nonpoint source pollution.  Procedures to address risk in trades with nonpoint sources 
may imply high transactions costs that diminish the potential gains from trading.
The article contains three remaining sections. First, a discussion on the nature of 
transactions costs and a brief literature review on transactions costs in water pollution 
trading will be presented. Second, a model on point source emissions for modeled 
nonpoint source runoff trading program in a TDML context with transactions costs will 
be constructed with a purpose to explore the implications of transactions costs on the 
trading design and performance. Third, concluding comments and suggestions for further 
research will close the discussion.
Transactions Costs in Pollution Trading
Studies on the design of PS/NPS trading system have tackled important issues including 
the optimal bases for trading, trading ratios (Letson 1992; Malik et al. 1993; Horan et al. 
2001; Horan et al. 2002; Shortle and Horan 2001; Horan and Shortle 2005) and 
asymmetric nature of information in the trading programs (Johansson 2002). They, 4
however, neglected to provide a formal analysis of the implications of transactions costs
for the structure of trades, the efficiency, and the optimal design of PS/NPS trading 
markets. Yet, features of the agricultural nonpoint problem suggest that transaction costs 
may be a significant factor (McCann and Easter 1999; Shortle et al. 1998; Shortle and 
Horan 2001).
Stavins (1995) defined transactions costs as inputs of resources or the difference between 
the buying and selling price of a commodity. When there are transfers of any property 
right, parties in the exchanges have to find one another, communicate and exchange 
information, which incurs transactions costs. The categories of transactions costs include 
search costs, negotiation costs, approval costs, monitoring costs, enforcement costs and 
insurance costs (Dudek and Wiener 1996 cited in Woerdman 2001). Transactions costs in 
PS/NPS trading consist of similar cost components as in any other permit trading 
programs. In this article, however, transactions costs can be thought of as some kind of 
economic impediments that sources incur when trading permits with each other. There 
will be separate transactions costs in exchanges of NPS and PS permits. Transactions 
costs will be functions of the number of permits sold or purchased of each permit type.
There have been several theoretical and empirical studies on the impacts of transactions 
costs on the outcome of tradable permits markets. In Stavins’ paper (1995), transactions 
costs representing direct financial costs of brokerage services increase abatement costs 
and decrease the number of trades in point emission permit markets for all the functional 
forms of transactions costs assumed (fixed cost only, constant marginal transactions costs5
(MTC), increasing MTC and decreasing MTC). He, therefore, questions the exaggeration 
of the advantage due to their relative cost-effectiveness of tradable permit systems over 
the conventional command and control policies of pollution control. Montero (1997) 
extends Stavins’ (1995) by developing theoretical and numerical models that include 
uncertainty in trade approval and transactions costs, at the same time, allowing for the 
marginal control cost curves to be discontinuous. He finds qualitative similar results to 
those presented in Stavins’ (1995). However, the numerical model for a hypothetical NOx
trading program shows that marketable permit system is still cost-effective even at high 
level of transactions costs and uncertainty. When the initial allocation of permits is close 
to the least-cost equilibrium, there is minimal reduction of the overall welfare.
Cason and Gangadharan have done a number of empirical research on transactions costs
in tradable permit markets. Gangadharan (2000) uses an econometric approach to show 
that some transactions costs variables can explain why a significant number of facilities 
do not trade in the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) in Los Angeles. 
The author suggests that regulators must design programs that facilitate the evolution of 
market, encouraging participation in order to obtain the projected cost savings from 
permit markets. Cason and Gangadharan (2003) conducted an experimental study to 
investigate how transactions costs interact with initial permit allocations to determine the 
cost-effectiveness of emissions abatement. The experiments provide a formal test for the 
theoretical hypotheses proposed in Stavins (1995). 
Nagurney and Dhanda (2000) model multi-product, multi-pollutant oligopolistic firms 6
engaging in competitive markets of ambient-based pollution permits in the presence of 
transactions costs. The authors include both uniformly and non-uniformly mixed 
assimilative pollutants in their model of ambient-based pollution permit system. The 
model allows for product market imperfection, uniformly and non-uniformly mixed 
assimilative pollutants trading and transactions costs but it has not dealt with trading in 
PS/NPS pollution in the presence of transactions costs. The ambient concentration in the 
model is formed by uniformly and non-uniformly mixed assimilative pollutants of point 
source emissions. The uncertainty and unobservability in the measure of nonpoint source 
emissions have not been accounted for in this paper. 
It is interesting, however, to note that most of these studies concern with air rather than 
water pollution trading and, if water trading is considered, the focus is point source 
emissions rather than nonpoint source pollution. Transactions costs and nonpoint source 
water pollution trading, therefore, remain a much unexplored area of environmental 
policy research. This article, therefore, seeks to narrow the gap in this area of research.  
In the next section, a model of point source for modeled nonpoint source trading program 
in a TMDL context with transactions costs will be constructed. Cap-and-trade is the type 
of market for the PS/NPS water pollution trading program and transactions costs are 
explicitly accounted for in both selling and buying exchanges of NPS and PS permits.
Model of PS/NPS Water Pollution Trading with Transactions Costs
A PS/NPS water pollution trading market can be thought of in the context of a river along 
which there are both point and agricultural nonpoint sources whose emissions contribute 7
to the ambient concentration of the watershed. Point sources produce uniformly mixing 
emissions, ek (k=1,…,s), which can be measured with certainty but nonpoint source 
loadings, ri (i=1,…,n), are stochastic and unobserved, which will involve uncertainty in 
their measurement. It is assumed that there is only one receptor area. A depiction of such 
a watershed can been seen in figure 1.
Figure 1. An illustration of a watershed with point and nonpoint sources
First-best market design
The water quality authority wants to minimize the cost of achieving a TMDL-type target 
of the form




i M T e r







Assuming that M is selected according to the probability of violation which is considered 
acceptable, then this constraint can be re-expressed as
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where  is the minimum probability water quality will accept for achieving the standard.  
Without knowledge of the joint distribution function for nonpoint emissions, Chebychev 
inequality can be used to express the environmental target as

















where  ) ( i i r E   and  ) ( j i ij r r E   .  Accordingly, the margin of error is expressed in 
terms of the variance of total emissions, which depends on the variances and covariances 












Following the development of US trading programs, trading takes place between mean 
nonpoint source emission and actual point source emissions.  The imperfect substitution 
between point and nonpoint sources is handled using a trade ratio, t.  The ratio would 
optimally be differentiated, but again consistent with the development of US programs, 
we take the trade ratio to be uniform for all PS/NPS trades.  There are two types of 
permits, NPS permits, and PS permits.  A firm has an endowment of each type, and then 
can buy or sell within or across types.  Let:9

0
i r the initial allocation of NPS permits to source i

0
i e the initial allocation of PS permits to source i
 i br purchases of NPS permits by source i 
 i sr sales of NPS permits by source i
 i be purchases of PS permits by source i 
 i se sales of PS permits by source i 
A firm’s PS permit holdings are therefore given by:
(4)  i i i i se be e e   
0
Similarly, a firm’s NPS permit holding are given by
(5) i i i i sr br r r   
0
Firms are required to hold sufficient permits to justify the emissions, or modeled runoff
levels.  For a PS firm, the constraint is
(6)  i i i e r t e  
where t is the trade ratio set by the water quality authority to adjust for the imperfect 
substitution between point and nonpoint sources.  The restriction on an NPS firm is 
(7)  i i i e r t   
where  ) ( i i r E   is the modeled nonpoint source loadings. The agricultural runoff and 
the point  source  emissions  in  this  model  are both  considered to  be  uniformly mixed 
across all sources.
The water quality authority limits permits such that 10
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The market is assumed to be perfectly competitive.  In equilibrium, PS permits trade at 
price  e p  and NPS permits trade at price r p . 
NPS Profit Maximization
In the market equilibrium, NPS firm i (for all i) maximizes its profit
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subject to (4), (5), and (7), where  (.)
l
z TC is the transactions cost of purchasing (z = b) or 
selling (z = s) permits of type l (l = r or l= e).  The firm’s Kuhn Tucker Lagrange 
function, after combing the constraints, is
] ) ( ) ( [ ˆ
0 0
i i i i i i i
r
i r se be e sr br r t L           
First order necessary conditions include
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We assume (9) is satisfied as an equality, implying that the firm produces.  Arbitrage will 
eliminate opportunities to profit from buying permits simply to sell permits of any given 
type.  Accordingly, in equilibrium a firm will be either buyer or seller of NPS permits, 
but not both, and will either buy or sell PS permits, but not both.  Further if the firm is a 
buyer of NPS permits, it will not be a seller of PS permits, nor will a firm that is a buyer 
of PS permits be a seller of NPS permits.  Finally, arbitrage will lead to the indifference 
between purchases or sales of alternative permit types.  In equilibrium, several cases can 
then be defined:
(i) NPS firm buying NPS permits and/or buying PS permits
(ii) NPS firm selling NPS permits and/ or selling PS permits
(iii) PS firm buying NPS permits and/or buying PS permits
(iv) PS firm selling NPS permits and/ or selling PS permits
(i) An NPS firm buying permits will satisfy 10 and/or 12 as equalities, with 11 and 13 






































































































Without  transactions costs,  the marginal willingness to  pay for pollution  reduction is 
equal  to  the  permit  prices.  Since  arbitrage  leads  to  indifference between  buying  and 
selling alternative permit types, the trading ratio is equal to the price ratio of the two 
types of permits. 

















, the NPS firm will choose 
to buy NPS permits so that the private marginal benefit of NPS runoff is equal to the 
marginal cost of not  abating the NPS  runoff (which  is  the sum  of price of the NPS 
permits and the marginal transactions costs required to complete the exchange adjusted 
by the trading ratio). Similarly, equation (15) implies that the NPS firm will choose to 
buy  PS  permits  until  the  marginal  private  benefit  from  NPS  runoff  is  equal  to  the 
marginal  cost  of  not  abating  the  PS  emissions  (the  sum  of  PS  permit  price  and  the 
marginal transactions costs involved in buying these permits). 13
It can, therefore, be seen that the marginal cost of not abating NPS runoff is higher in the 
case with transactions costs than without transactions costs for a NPS buying permits. 
The equilibrium number of NPS and/or PS permits purchased by NPS firms in the case of 
non-linear transactions costs is less than that in the case of costless trade. The magnitude 
of the reduction in permits traded depends on the marginal impacts of transactions costs.
(ii) An NPS firm selling permits will satisfy 11 and/or 13 as equalities, with 10 and 12 













































































, the necessary conditions for a NPS 























In the absence of transactions costs NPS firms will choose to sell permits until marginal 

















, the marginal profit from NPS pollution for a NPS permit 
seller is equal to the permit  prices minus the transactions costs. Hence, the marginal 
revenue from selling permits is lower in the presence of transactions costs. NPS permit 
sellers execute fewer sales of NPS as well as PS permits than in the costless trade case. 











































This condition implies indifference at the margin between being a buyer and a seller of 
NPS and/or PS permits.
PS Profit Maximization
Similarly, PS firm i (for all i) maximizes its profit
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subject to (4), (5), and (6).  The firm’s Lagrange function, after combing the constraints, 
is
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First order necessary conditions include15
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As above, we assume (21) is satisfied as an equality, implying that the firm produces.  
And as above, arbitrage will eliminate opportunities to profit from buying permits simply 
to sell permits of any given type.  Proceeding with the same fashion for the NPS polluters 



























































































The interpretation for the case of PS permit buyer and seller is very similar to that of the 
NPS firm. Transactions costs induce PS buyers and sellers to execute a lower level of 
trades in both types of permits compared to that in the case of zero transaction costs. 
Equation (28) similar to (20) also implies indifference at the margin between being a 
buyer and a seller of NPS and/or PS permits.
The important point to note is that transactions costs unarguably reduce the volumes of 
trade for both types of permits. This is consistent with the findings in Stavins’ model with 
uniform point source trading market. The more interesting implication of this trading 
mechanism, however, is that the presence of four types of transactions costs leads to the 
segregation of markets into four different classes: NPS buyers and sellers of one or both 
types of permits and PS buyers and sellers of one or both types of permits.
A graphical example of the optimal market design
In this section a graphical representation rather than a formal theoretical framework on 
the optimal market design will be provided. Suppose there are only 2 firms, one point 
source and one nonpoint source in the watershed. The optimal trading equilibrium with 
and without transactions costs can be depicted in figure 2. The environmental target set 
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Assuming that the total variance of emissions is positively related to the expected 17
loadings, i.e. as the mean loadings decreases, the total variance of emissions also 
declines. For the purpose of this example, it is assumed that     ) ( . The 
environmental target then can be re-written as:






















Equation (29) represents the feasible space of different combinations of nonpoint source 






















Since the envelope of the feasible trading space is a straight line, equation (30) can also 
be considered as the function of the trading ratio. The optimal trading bundle occurs 
















Figure 2. Optimal trading with and without transactions costs18
Without transactions costs, the trade volume of point source emissions is |eio-e*| and that 
of nonpoint source runoff is |rio-r*|. Under the presence of transactions costs, the optimal 
level of point source pollution is lower (e**<e*) and the optimal level of nonpoint source 
runoff is higher (µ**>µ*) than those in the case of no transactions costs. With 
transactions costs, the watershed trading scheme leads to less nonpoint pollution being 
abated. Given that nonpoint pollution is associated with higher risks, transactions costs 
actually increase the over all risk level for the agents in the watershed.
Conclusion
Nonpoint source pollution control remains a challenging task for water quality regulators. 
There have been attempts to design market instruments to mitigate the levels of nonpoint 
source emissions at least cost. One of those instruments is PS/NPS trading programs. To 
date, existing programs are of emissions-for-loadings type whereas emissions-for-inputs 
type market has been theoretically designed. Studies on the performance of these two 
types of markets have encompassed the uncertainty problem in measuring nonpoint 
source loadings in their design. They, however, have not dealt with the existence of 
transactions costs which have potential importance in PS/NPS permit trading. In this 
article, the impacts of transactions costs on the performance of cap-and-trade point-
nonpoint market have been considered. One of the main findings of this article is that 
there are four different trading classes: NPS firms buying NPS permits and/or PS permits, 
PS firms buying NPS permits and/or PS permits, NPS firms selling NPS permits and/or 
PS permits and PS firms selling NPS permits and/or PS permits. Traders are indifferent 
between individual point sources and indifferent between individual nonpoint sources 19
because transactions costs are the same for individuals within classes. Transactions costs, 
however, reduce the equilibrium number of permits traded (ps and nps) compared to the 
costless trade case. By preventing buyers and sellers from trading, transactions costs 
undermine the efficiency of the trading scheme. Despite the interesting findings, this 
article is a good starting point for further research. Issues that can be further explored 
include the implications of spatial variations of firm on the nonpoint loadings and 
transactions costs, the impacts of market design components (such as the initial 
allocation, trading ratio and emission target) on the performance of the trading scheme, 
issues of how to address risks in the design of markets to achieve a first-best allocation.20
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